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Lawrence and Ed Learner. Vivek Dehejia and Sam Pelzman have also provided
useful suggestions.
The experience of decline in real wages of the unskilled workers
(Lu) during the 1980s in the United States, and the increase instead in their
unemployment in Europe (due to the comparative inflexibility of their labour
markets vis-a-vis those of the United States)1, has prompted a search for
possible explanations. This search has become more acute with the
evidence that the adverse trend for the unskilled has not been mitigated
during the 1990s to date.
A favoured explanation, indeed the haunting fear, of the unions and
of many policymakers is that international trade is a principal source of the
pressures that translate into wage decline and/or unemployment of the
unskilled. As Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994) put it: Is Marx Striking Again?
I have examined the question of trade explanations at great length in
Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994) and the issue has been extensively treated in
Bhagwati and Kosters (1994). My conclusion is that the trade explanation is
exceptionally weak for the 1980s, that there are good theoretical and
empirical reasons why trade did not cause the adverse impact one might
fear, and that the case therefore for the overwhelming role of technical
change (biased against the use of unskilled labour) in explaining the
misfortune of the unskilled is very strong, indirectly and directly as well.
Here, I recapitulate and evaluate the main linkages that have been
now advanced between trade and real wages, extending the argumentation
beyond that in Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994), originally finished in mid-
1993, in light of further research that has emerged since then. I also take the
opportunity to speculate about the future, instead of confining myself to only
the 1980s experience and its explanation.
1
 Note that this contrast between the US and Europe is just that, and is supposed to
explain only the differential impact of technical change, trade etc. on wages in one country
and on unemployment in the other. This labour-market explanation is almost a cliche by now,
having been propounded by virtually every economist who has spoken on the issue in the
last several years. Among the more recent writings on the subject are popular pieces by
myself, Krugman and many others.
1. Prices of Unskilled-Labour(Lu)-intensive Goods have fallen and caused the
Real Wages of Lu to fall, in turn: Economvwide, North-South Explanation
Most economists' favorite explanation has been that trade with the Lu-
abundant South (i.e. poor countries), as a result of their entry into world markets
and the freeing of trade barriers against them, has led to the fall in the real wages
of Lu.
This argument requires, in general equilibrium, that the prices of the goods
using Lu should have fallen too: as I noted in 1991 when encountering the Borjas-
Freeman-Katz paper (1991) which asserted that trade was the cause of the decline
in real wages without mentioning, leave aside examining, the behavior of goods
prices (see the detailed critique in Bhagwati, 1991a and 1991b, and subsequently
in Bhagwati and Dehejia, 1994 and Bhagwati, 1994). I conjectured (1991a) that the
goods prices had actually gone the other way from that required by the assertion.
The detailed empirical investigation by Lawrence and Slaughter (1993),
reported again by Lawrence in his paper for this Conference, confirms my
conjecture for the US. The subsequent attempt by Sachs and Schatz (1994), in
Brookinqs Papers, to overturn the Lawrence-Slaughter findings will not hold water.
It relies on removing from the data set the prices of computers, a procedure that can
be debated, and even then, the new data set yields a coefficient of the required
sign that is both extremely small and statistically insignificant. Some newspaper
accounts (e.g. the recent survey in The Economist of North-South issues and a
recent Financial Times column by Sir Sam Brittan) have reported this "finding"
without realizing that, while Noam Chomsky correctly argues that two negatives
make a positive in every human language (while two positives do not make a
negative in any), the two negatives of a small coefficient and a statistically
insignificant one to boot, do not add up to a positive support for the assertion at
issue!
Lawrence (this Conference and 1994) notes this and also reports that the
goods price behavior in Germany and Japan, with and without computers, does not
support the trade explanation either. Besides, the shifts in factor ratios also do not
support the explanation for the US data.
In short, the necessary empirical evidence for the absolutely critical element
in this particular trade explanation is absent, at worst, and exceptionally weak, at
best. The news is not good then for the proponents of the trade explanation along
these North-South lines.
Besides, as noted in Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994), even if the goods prices
were behaving as required, the conclusion that the result would be a decline in the
real wages of Lu requires added assumptions familiar to the students of the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, many of which can be violated without difficulty in the
real world. We cite, in particular, a computable-model-based study by Deardorff e_L
aL of Mexico after NAFTA which managed to show even a rise in real wages of Lu
in the US by relaxing one particular assumption of the SS analysis: the assumption
of perfect competition.
Three further comments are in order:
(1) Why have goods prices of labor-intensive goods not fallen during the
1980s? I suspect that it may have to do, at least as one major explanation in the
case of traded goods, with the fact that the VERs on textiles, shoes etc., and the
anti-dumping actions against several other products that broke out in the early
1980s, may have led to an export restraint that would translate into effective
(countervailing) rise in c.i.f. landed prices, and hence in US domestic prices as
well, of course. Ed Learner has reminded us that the Asian competition in textiles
and apparel broke out seriously towards the end of the 1970s , suggesting that the
decline in real wages in the 1980s was a lagged response to that. But this
explanation will not work: the swift response of the industry to the increased
competition from Asia was precisely to tighten the Multi-fibre Agreement's
restrictiveness to offset the potential price fall, leading to the anti-SS-explanation
price behavior that Lawrence has observed for several countries. The
restrictiveness of trade barriers is therefore likely to have increased as required.
Such elasticity and also selectivity are in fact a characteristic of the "administered"
protection as embodied in anti-dumping actions, VERs etc. and make them both a
preferred instrument of protection by industry and also a serious hazard to free
trade.
(2) Can we then be sanguine about future prospects for this trade
explanation? I believe that we can. Let me explain.
The typical worry is: what happens when China, India etc. come on board
with the trade liberalization that is occurring in many countries? But this
presupposes that the resulting trade expansion will be typically in the exchange of
Lu-intensive for Lu-unintensive goods. But there is a great continuum of goods and
considerable trade takes place in differentiated products among "similarly-
endowed" countries, at all levels of per capita income. One could then
accommodate huge increases in trade without the prices of Lu-intensive goods
falling.
But just suppose that they will tend to do so. Then, there may well be an
asymmetry with the 1980s. If the Uruguay Round is ratified, there will now be
restraints on VERs — only one will be allowed eventually per Contracting Party —
and the MFA will be phased out in 10 years. The ability to offset potential price
competition from the South, in the way we did in the 1980s, may no longer be
possible.
But even if prices did fall in the end for imported Lu-intensive goods in the
next decade, recall that it is by no means inevitable that this will translate into a fall,
rather than a rise, in the real wages of the unskilled in the OECD countries.
Bhagwati and Dehejia(1994) have noted several reasons why, as noted by
Stolper and Samuelson themselves, §JL factors of production can gain from the fall
in import prices and the associated trade expansion that trade with the South may
bring. And these reasons are not at all unrealistic, as I have already indicated. It is
then simply a fallacy to think that the hand of Stolper-Samuelson theorem is an iron
fist aimed at our unskilled workers.
(3) But whether one is, in my view, an unnecessary pessimist or an optimist
on the issue, one policy option follows: we ought to support, not oppose, policy
programs to limit the growth of population (and hence unskilled workers) in the
South. The optimists will support such programs because they are surely desirable
for the large countries such as India and China, and this is the considered view of
these countries' policymakers, as evident from the Cairo Conference on population
this summer. The pessimists should support them in our own interest as well. Let
me explain why.
For, if immigration, which directly brings these aliens into our midst, cannot
be totally controlled by us and borders often tend to get beyond control because
our political traditions prevent us from shooting at illegal immigrants coming across
borders, and if trade is also feared to be simply an indirect way of letting in such
alien labour, both phenomena then amounting to pressure on the wages of our
unskilled, then the situation is fairly grim, especially if the decline of the ability to
redistribute prevents us from compensating the decline in real wages of our
unskilled. In that case, we can only hope for lower pressures from the unskilled
abroad: and this implies our assistance in acceleration of their capital
accumulation, on the one hand, and in effective control of their population growth,
on the other.
The shift from the Bush administration's more complacent attitudes on
population control, prompted largely by the religious right, to the Clinton
administration's energetic support of effective population policies at Cairo,
prompted partly by liberal views concerning women's rights, can then be explained
also as a response (among several) to the fears of the adverse effect of trade with
the South on the real wages of our unskilled.
2."Kaleidoscopic" Comparative Advantage and Higher Labour Turnover: An
Alternative Trade Explanation:
Bhagwati and Dehejia suggest an alternative trade explanation for real
wage decline. The explanation has essentially four parts:
* Greater internationalization of markets -- rising trade-to-GNP ratios, greater
role of transnational corporations in globalizing production — , as also the diffusion
of production knowhow (a la Baumol et.al.) within OECD countries and the
increased integration of world capital markets (a la Jeff Frankel) have narrowed the
margin of comparative advantage enjoyed by many industries in any major OECD
country. There are therefore more footloose industries now than ever, leading to
greater volatility in comparative advantage, i.e.more "knife-edge" and hence
kaleidoscopic comparative advantage, between countries.
* This will lead to higher labour turnover between industries and hence more
frictional unemployment.
* Increased labour turnover could flatten the growth profile of earnings due
to less skill accumulation.
* These three factors could also explain increasing wage differential, ceteris
paribus, if skilled workers have greater transferability of workplace-acquired skills
than do unskilled workers.
This theory has to be investigated: students of mine at Columbia are doing
this. E.g. Eugene Beaulieu is examining the hypothesis, using microeconomic data
from the 1988-91 version of the Labour Market Activity Survey in Canada, that has
a large and rich data base and detailed information on several personal
characteristics of workers, and will enable him to trace the labour market
experience of a sample of workers before and after CU FT A. He is also working
with alternative measures of comparative advantage and changes therein.
I might add that there is suggestive evidence on elements 3 and 4 of the
explanation above in labour studies, as noted in Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994), and
also in Lisa Lynch's paper for this Conference.
3. Rents. Unionization et.al.
The above arguments are economywide trade explanations. But there are
industry-specific trade explanations, of course, of what happens to industries
impacted by import competition.
(i)Where these are competitive industries, clearly the earnings of the
productive factors within them will be reduced at the outset. When the industry is
wiped out, these earnings will go to zero, of course! The overall, final effect on real
wages of these factors including the unskilled, however, cannot be determined
without finding out the general-equilibrium implications of the parametric change,
which will take into account, for instance, the absorption of the displaced factors
elsewhere in the economy, which means going back to the economywide
explanation.
(2) What does the presence of unions, and hence of rents to the unskilled in
the unionized sectors, do for our argument?There are indeed models of several
kinds of imperfect competition in factor markets in the general-equilibrium analysis
of international trade which could be extended to address the question of the
overall impact of changing goods prices on the real wages: but the answers can be
quite unexpected. E.g. if unions maintain a wage differential between
homogeneous insiders and outsiders, the conventional inferences such as that a
fall in the relative price of the unionized-sector's good will lead to a fall in its
relative production, and therefore presumably a fall in the unionized factor
intensively used in it, will not necessarily hold , undermining the SS-type argument
(inferring factor reward changes from goods price changes). 2 To my knowledge,
there is no analysis of the effects of price declines in unionized industries such as
autos that satisfactorily addresses these deeper analytical issues that arise when
the effects of unions are considered in an appropriate fashion.
(3) Then again, we know that, during the 1980s, the unionised sectors in the
US, especially autos and steel, were politically powerful enough to shield
themselves greatly through anti-dumping actions and VERs, OMAs etc. from the
effects of foreign competition (which incidentally was overwhelmingly from the
North, not the South). Given both the small percentage of the US unskilled labour
force in unionized manufacturing sectors and the substantial cushioning of
competition through trade restraints in any event, it is highly unlikely that the
analysts can demonstrate (through this route) a significant role for trade in affecting
real wages in the US during the 1980s.3
4.The Question of International Capital Mobility: Globalization and Real Wages
So far, I have considered only the question of a direct link between trade
and real wages. But there are fears of an adverse impact on real wages of the
unskilled that follow from fears arising from international capital mobility.
* Thus, a major worry of the unions is that the outflow of capital drives down
real wages of Lu. However, during the 1980s, in the US, more DFI (direct foreign
investment) came in than went out, both during the period and relative to 1950s
and 1960s. Moreover, the US ran a current account deficit so that foreign savings
came in, if that is the measure one wants to work with instead. The facts are
therefore against that hypothesis.
* But again, if one uses a bargaining-type of framework, it might be said that
the bargaining power of employers has increased vis-a-vis that of employees
2
 There is, in fact, a considerable literature on this subject, with contributions by Steve
Magee, Murray Kemp, Jagdish Bhagwati and T.N.Srinivasan, Ronald Findlay , Ronald Jones
etc. in the 1970s.
3
 For a complementary discussion of rents, citing the broader literature on the subject
which includes efficiency-wage arguments, see Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994).
because employers can Increasingly say in a global economy that they will pack up
bags and leave and therefore, for any given output, its distribution between Lu
income and other income including profits may have shifted against Lu.
Perhaps the labour economists at the Conference can tell us whether there
is persuasive evidence for such a bargaining model as a determinant of relative
rewards between factors within any US industry and whether, for such industries,
there is evidence of shift of location elsewhere having altered the distribution
against Lu income.4 I am myself unaware of any systematic empirical or theoretical
work on these questions to date.
At a time when total union membership is down to less than 15% of US
private employment, however, I doubt if this explanation is likely to be important in
any event, unless of course the decline in unionism is itself attributed in a
significant measure (as I believe it cannot be) to the loss of bargaining power due
to the threat of exit by firms to other countries.
4
 The threat of exit may exist, of course, even if no exit has actually occurred in the industry.
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